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Case Notes
WARSAW CONVENTION-ACCIDENT DURING EMBARKA-
TION-Passengers, Who Were Assembled in an Airport Transit
Lounge to Undergo a Search at the Time of a Terrorist Attack on
the Lounge, Were "in the Operations of Embarking" as That
Phrase is Used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, Thereby
Rendering the Air Carrier Liable for Bodily Injuries Sustained.
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1977).
Callioppi Evangelinos and her children purchased round-trip
tickets from Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for transportation
from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, through New York, to Athens,
Greece, and return. On August 5, 1973, they arrived at the Athens
Airport for their return flight to the United States and reported to
the check-in counter where their luggage was checked and tickets
and boarding passes were issued by TWA employees. After their
tickets and boarding passes were examined, the Evangelinos pro-
ceeded to the transit lounge, which is restricted to passengers
ticketed and scheduled to depart, and to other personnel, who are
not passengers, needed to service the area. The Evangelinos, in due
time, obtained seating assignments and proceeded to their departure
gate following the announcement of the boarding of their flight.
At the gate there were two separate lines, one for males and one for
females, where the Greek police were conducting a handbag search
and a physical search. After being searched, passengers were to
proceed out of the transit lounge and board buses which would
take them to the airplane, approximately 250 meters away. The
family took their position in line with the majority of the passengers
of the same flight who had not gone through the search. While
they were in line, two terrorists threw hand grenades and fired
gunshots into the crowd.' The Evangelinos were severely wounded
I After the attack, the terrorists took up a position behind a bar in the transit
lounge and held thirty-two people as hostages. After approximately two hours of
negotiations with local officials, the terrorists surrendered. As a consequence of
the attack, forty TWA passengers were wounded; two TWA passengers died im-
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by shrapnel or bullets and brought suit against TWA, seeking re-
covery through absolute liability based upon the Warsaw Conven-
tion! (hereinafter cited as the Convention) as modified by the
Montreal Agreement of 1966,' and alternatively for negligence. On
cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of absolute liabil-
ity, the District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania held
for the defendant.' The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Held, reversed and re-
manded: Passengers, who were assembled in an airport transit
lounge to undergo a search at the time of a terrorist attack on the
lounge, were "in the operations of embarking" as that phrase is
used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, thereby rendering
the air carrier liable for bodily injuries sustained. Evangelinos v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977).
In 1934, the United States became a party to the Convention, a
treaty subsequently signed by 107 nations, applying to all "interna-
tional transportation of persons . . . performed by aircraft for
hire."' The overall objective of the Convention was to provide uni-
form rules relating to air transportation documents and to limit air
carrier liability for accidents associated with air transportation.!
The Convention limited damages to a maximum amount of 125,000
francs ($8,300) per passenger' and provided that a carrier "shall
not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
mediately and a third several days later; a passenger of another airline died im-
mediately; four TWA employees were injured; and an undetermined number of
passengers and employees of other airlines were wounded. Evangelinos v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 96 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
2 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), concluded at Warsaw, Poland, October,
1929. The treaty is officially entitled Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. (All cites to the Warsaw
Convention are hereafter given by Article number only.)
831 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). Both the Convention and the Montreal Agree-
ment are reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1970).
4396 F. Supp. 95 (1975).
1 Article 1 (1). The Warsaw Convention was signed by the representatives of
23 countries at Warsaw, Poland, on October 12, 1929, and on October 29, 1934,
President Roosevelt proclaimed adherence after the United States Senate had ad-
vised adherence on June 15, 1934. 78 CoNG. REC. 11,582 (1934). For a thorough
discussion of the history of the Convention, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967).




necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
for him or them to take such measures.""
On November 15, 1965, the State Department filed formal
notice of denunciation of the treaty, to take effect six months later.'
An accompanying press release stated that this denunciation would
be withdrawn if the principal international air carriers agreed to
raise the limit of liability to $75,000 and if there was a reasonable
prospect that the Convention would be formally amended to in-
corporate this modification." On May 13, 1966, the major airlines
of the world signed the Montreal Agreement.11 Under the terms of
this agreement each airline bound itself to include in its tariffs a
special contract raising the limit of liability for each passenger to
$75,000 and waiving the defense of due care. Liability became
absolute unless the passenger himself was at fault.' Satisfied with
the agreement, the State Department officially withdrew the de-
nunciation."
$Article 20.
9 Senator Robert Kennedy, in August 1965, had suggested that the United
States withdraw from the Warsaw Convention. He stated, on the Senate floor,
"Over 2 million Americans travel annually on international flights. Assuring that
they and their families are adequately protected in case of accident is, conse-
quently, a matter of widespread importance. . . .No one questions the fact that
the protection now afforded international travelers is woefully inadequate." 111
CONG. REC. 20,164 (1965).
10 Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965).
The Hague Protocol was concluded in 1955 and entered into force August 1,
1963. It modified the Convention by increasing the maximum liability limit to
$16,582.. Kennelly, supra note 6, at 213.
The 1971 Guatemala Protocol will formally amend the Convention to pro-
vide for absolute liability up to $100,000. Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of
Guatemala City, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 519, 523 (1972). The official text of the
Guatemala Protocol is in ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971).
Neither treaty was ratified by the United States.
11 The Montreal Agreement was approved by the United States through the
Civil Aeronautics Board, May 13, 1966. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
12Article 21 of the Convention provides: "If the carrier proves the damage
was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the court
may, in accordance with provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly
or partly from his liability."
1154 DEP'T STATE BULL. 955 (1966).
An accompanying press release stated that "the conditions which led the
United States to serve its notice of November 15 have substantially changed. Ac-
cordingly, the United States of America believes that its continuing objectives
. . .of adequate protection for international air travelers will best be assured
within the framework of the Warsaw Convention." Press Release No. 111, 54
DEP'T STATE BULL. 956 (1966).
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The terms of the Convention provide that the air carriers must
deliver to the passengers a ticket which shall contain, among other
things, "[a] statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by [the] convention."'" If the carrier
accepts a passenger without having delivered him a ticket, the car-
rier will not be entitled to take advantage of the provisions of the
Convention which exclude or limit its liability.5 Likewise, by the
Montreal Agreement, the carriers stipulated that they will furnish
to their passengers, on the ticket, a notice in ten point type advising
them of the limitations of liability."
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking (emphasis
supplied).
The Warsaw Convention was the result of two international con-
ferences-one in Paris in 1925 and one in Warsaw in 1929. In
Paris, a small group of experts, the Comit6 Internati6nale Tech-
nique d'Experts Juridique Ariens (CITEJA), was appointed to
prepare a draft convention for the delegates to consider at War-
saw." The CITEJA's draft held the carrier liable "from the moment
when travelers, goods or baggage enter in the aerodrome of de-
parture to the moment when they leave the aerodrome of destina-
tion."" The Conference substantially accepted the proposal as to
goods and baggage,"' but it rejected it for travelers.' The Brazilian
14 Article 3 (1) (e).
"Article 3(2).
1631 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
'
7 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 989, (1976).
"Minutes, Second International Conference of Private Aeronautical Law,
October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, 264 (R. Homer and D. Legrez transl. 1975). (as
cited in In Re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 157 (D.P.R. 1975), aff'd sub nom.
Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, - U.S.
97 S.Ct. 246 (1977)) [Hereinafter cited as Minutes].
'1 Id. at 206 (as cited in In Re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 157 (D.P.R.
1975), afl'd sub nom. Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1977)).
1o Minutes at 82-83 (as cited in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
550 F.2d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 1977)).
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delegates proposed that liability not attach until the plaintiffs are
inside the aircraft,' but Professor George Ripert, the French dele-
gate, argued that the article should be broad enough to allow the
courts to take into account the facts of each case.' The delegates
accepted Professor Ripert's proposal and cast Article 17 in its
present form.'
Prior to the decision in Evangelinos, only one other American
case had arisen in which the court was called upon to interpret
"operations of embarking." In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,"
a case arising out of the same incident in Evangelinos, the Second
Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the passengers in the
line waiting to undergo search were in the operation of embarking.
The Day court agreed with the district judge that a tripartite test
should be applied, based on "activity (what the plaintiffs were
doing), control (at whose direction) and location."'5 It concluded
that, applying the facts in Day to each of these factors, the plaintiffs
were in the course of embarking."' To further support its judgment
for the plaintiffs, the Day court maintained that a broad construc-
tion of Article 17 is in harmony with modem theories of accident
cost allocation;" that its interpretation fosters the goal of accident
prevention;" and that administrative costs of the absolute liability
"Id. at 71 (as cited in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d
152, 161 (3d Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion)).
22 Id. at 73 (as cited in Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279, 283 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1977)).
2Id. at 82-84, 205-06 (as cited in In Re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 157
(D.P.R. 1975), afl'd sub nom. Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1977)).
24 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), afl'g 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 989 (1976).
2Id. at 33 (parentheticals by the court).
" "Whether one looks to the passengers' activity (which was a condition to
embarkation), to the restriction of their movements, to the imminence of board-
ing, or even to their position adjacent to the terminal gate ... the plaintiffs were
'in the course of embarking.'" Id. at 33-34 (parentheticals by the court).
At the time of the terrorist attack two of the plaintiffs were being escorted by
a TWA passenger relations agent to the departure gate, where they would be
searched. All the other plaintiffs were standing in line waiting to be searched. The
court stated that these differences in location had no significance to the outcome
of the case. Id. at 32 n.5.
27 "The airlines are in a position to distribute among all passengers what would
otherwise be a crushing burden upon those few unfortunate enough to become
'accident' victims." Id. at 34.
"' "The airlines, in marked contrast to individual passengers, are in a better
1977]
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system are dramatically lower than other alternatives." Finally, the
court found support for its interpretation in the legislative history
of the Warsaw Convention."
Before Day there were no American decisions defining the scope
of "operations of embarking." A German court, the Berlin Court
of Appeals, granted relief under Article 17 to a plaintiff who fell
down a staircase leading from the terminal to the traffic apron,
stating that the air carrier had already committed the passengers
under its care when it requested them to go from the waiting room
to the aircraft." Prior to Day the only plaintiffs seeking relief by
virtue of Article 17 alleged injuries which occured while aboard the
aircraft or while disembarking. In McDonald v. Air Canada,"
recovery was denied a woman who fell and was injured in the
baggage area of the airport after leaving the defendant's airplane.
She argued that she was in the operation of disembarking and
therefore the defendant was liable under Article 17. The court dis-
agreed, stating that if the words of Article 17 are given their ordi-
nary meaning, a passenger has completed the operations of dis-
embarking by the time he has descended from the plane and has
reached a safe point inside the terminal building.'3 The court further
maintained that the economic rationale for liability limits does not
apply to accidents "far removed from the operation of aircraft."'
Three other American cases have also held the Convention in-
applicable where the passengers had, as the courts determined,
completed the operations of disembarking.' In addition to these
posture to persuade, pressure or, if need be, compensate airport managers to adopt
more stringent security measures against terrorist attacks." Id.
29 "If Article 17 were not applicable, the passengers could recover-if at all-
only by maintaining a costly suit in a foreign land against the operator of the
airport." Id.
Old. at 34-35. The court noted the rejection of the Brazilian proposal and the
CITEJA draft and the acceptance of the French proposal.
11 Blumenfeld v. BEA, 1962 Z. Luft. R. 78 (Berlin Court of Appeals 1961)
(as cited in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 156 (3d
Cir. 1977)).
2439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
33 Id. at 1405.
"Id. The plaintiff in this case was not able to establish what had caused her to
fall and suffer injuries. The court, in addition to its ruling that disembarking had
been completed, was not convinced that an accident had occurred, which is neces-
sary under Article 17.
"In Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y.
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cases, a French court determined that the passenger there was not
covered by Article 17 even though he had not completed the
operations of disembarking."'
The Evangelinos court initially conceded that its task had been
significantly facilitated by the Second Circuit's recent decision in
Day." It then continued to extend, as did the Second Circuit, the
period of embarking to at least include the time that passengers
are waiting in line to be searched, pursuant to directions by the
airline.
The court maintained that in order to determine whether or not
the plaintiffs were in the operations of embarking, three factors
are relevant: the location of the accident, the activity in which the
passengers were engaged, and the control exercised by the airline
over the passengers when they were injured." The court noted the
contrast in Article 17 between the phrase "while on board the air-
craft" and the phrase "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking," and reasoned that the draftsmen made a conscious
June 28, 1974), a passenger, after landing, had walked through a jetway which
led from the aircraft door to the terminal, had continued across the upper floor
of the terminal, and had boarded an escalator to a lower level baggage area, when
she fell and was injured. The court simply stated that she had disembarked from
the aircraft as that term is used in Article 17.
In Klein v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 App. Div. 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1974), the court likewise found that the plaintiff had disembarked when he was
injured on a baggage conveyor belt after arriving safely within the terminal build-
ing.
In Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1977), the passengers had left the airplane and were in the
baggage area of the terminal building when they became victims of a terrorist
attack. The court adopted the tripartite test applied in Day v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 989 (1976).
In denying recovery the court stated that the plaintiffs were not engaged in any
activity relating to disembarkation from the plane, that they were located ap-
proximately one-third to one-half mile from the aircraft, and that they did not
appear to be acting under the direction of the airline.
11 Mach6 v. Air Fr., Rev. Fr. Droit Arien 343 (Cour d'Appel de Rouen 1967),
afl'd, Rev. Fr. Droit Arien 311 (Cour de Cassation 1970). Following a landing,
the plaintiff was being conducted with other passengers to the terminal building
by an employee of the airline. As he was crossing the "customs garden" en route,
he fell through a broken manhole cover and was injured. Although the court held
that the act of disembarking is not intended to cease when the passenger puts
his foot on the traffic apron, the plaintiff did not establish that the "customs gar-
den" presented risks inherent in aeronautical operation. [A brief translation of the
facts and holding is taken from 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 207 (1967).]
37 550 F.2d at 154.
88 Id. at 155.
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choice to go beyond a mere location test. If a strict location test
were adopted, results could differ based solely on the fortuity of
where the passenger was situated when he was injured. 9 The court
believed that a location test alone would be too arbitrary and too
specific to have broad application, since almost every airport and
every situation is different."0
The court argued that TWA had assumed control over the pas-
sengers by announcing the flight and directing them to stand near
the departure gate. The airline caused the passengers to "congre-
gate in an area and formation directly and solely related to em-
barkation on Flight 881."" Further evidence of this control was
the fact that TWA service personnel were guiding the passengers
at the gate and TWA security personnel were present.'
Activity and location are relevant factors, according to the
court, in construing "operations of embarking." They are, how-
ever, treated as aspects of control, meaning, the Evangelinos were
where they were directed to be, doing what they were instructed
to do in order to board the aircraft. The court stated that it placed
less weight upon carrier control than did the Day court, but control
appears to have been the primary concern. '
The first consideration then, is the actions an airline must take
before it is deemed to have assumed the necessary control. The
airline, in fact, never has complete authority over the passengers, at
least until they are secured in the aircraft. The court, however,
apparently determined that TWA had assumed control in the sense
that it had begun instructing passengers as to the procedure neces-
sary for boarding, and it had directed them to begin. This being so,
it would appear that upon the announcement of a flight and di-
rections to proceed to a designated location for boarding, passen-
gers will be in the "operations of embarking," provided the pas-




4 Id. at 155. Matte, in Trait6 de Droit A6rien-Aeronatique at 404-05 (1964),
maintains that coverage within Article 17 begins when the passengers are taken
in charge by the airline (as cited in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d
31, 37 n.17). See also SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 441-42 (3d ed. 1966).
They argue that coverage extends throughout the time the passenger's movements
are under the control of the carrier for the purposes of embarking and disem-
barking.
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sengers are complying with the instructions being given by the
airline.
The court stated that the tripartite test is appropriate for the
determination of a "safe place"; however, it offered no analysis of
how this test is to be applied to make such a determination. It
simply concluded that, applying the test, the plaintiffs were not in
a safe place. The court stated that the test was appropriate because
the "danger of violence-whether in the form of terrorism, hijack-
ing or sabotage-is today so closely associated with air transporta-
tion." Thus, the court may well deny recovery on the basis of
Article 17 to a plaintiff if he was engaged in the same activity, at
the same location, and under the same degree of control as the
plaintiffs in Evangelinos, but the injury results from exposure to a
risk determined by the court not to be closely associated with air
travel." Such a result would be consistent with those cases denying
recovery to passengers who alleged they were disembarking when
injured.' In those cases, the courts determined that the plaintiffs
were injured at a "safe" point, distant from the risks of air travel,
and therefore had completed disembarking." Conceding that the
"550 F.2d at 157.
"'If we regard the Convention as a whole, we are safe in assuming that the
intention was to limit its application to such time that the passenger is exposed
to dangers of aviation." Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by
International Convention, 7 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 20 (1936).
4McDonald v. Air Can., 439 F.2d 1402 (lst Cir. 1971) (injury resulting from
an unexplained fall); Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 17,145
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1974) (injury from a fall on an escalator); Klein v. KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 App. Div. 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1974) (injury on a
baggage conveyor belt); Mach6 v. Air Fr., Rev. Fr. Droit Arien 343 (Cour
d'Appel de Rouen 1967), af0'd, Rev. Fr. Droit Arien 311 (Cour de Cassation
1970) (injury from a fall into a manhole).
4 In Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 246 (1977), however, the passengers were injured in a terror-
ist attack, a risk the Evangelinos court deems applicable. The court stated that
"the sort of senseless violence involved in this case" cannot be appropriately re-
garded as a characteristic risk of air travel. 545 F.2d at 284. This determination
was not, however, crucial to the court's disposition of the case, for it applied the
tripartite test utilized in Day and Evangelinos and concluded that the passengers
in the baggage area had completed the process of disembarking. The court dis-
tinguished the terrorist attack in Day and Evangelinos by noting that the terror-
ists there took hostages and demanded an aircraft with which to escape. 545 F.2d
at 284 n.8.
In Mach6 v. Air Fr., Rev. Fr. Droit Arien 343 (Cour d'Appel de Rouen
1967), afl'd, Rev. Fr. Droit Arien 311 (Cour de Cassation 1970), the court agreed
that the plaintiff was still disembarking, but was not injured through a risk asso-
ciated with air travel.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
danger of terrorism is a current risk of air transportation," it would
appear that no place in the terminal building can be considered
safe, unless the court was maintaining that the passengers were
only exposed to this risk while in the search line.
TWA argued that the rejection of the CITEJA draft evidences
the intent of the delegates to exclude from liability the period dur-
ing which passengers are inside the terminal.' The court disagreed,
noting that "nothing in the debates indicates that the line was
finally and unalterably drawn at the walls of airline terminal build-
ings" and "if such an explicit line had been intended, the language
of Article 17 would now reflect it.""°
The two circuits which have now considered the scope of "the
operations of embarking" have not drawn a definite line marking
the beginning of the period of embarkation. Under the test applied
in these cases, no certain line can be drawn, which, as the Day
court determined, was the intention of the delegates to the Con-
vention in accepting the French proposal for Article 17. It is now
at least established that the operations of embarking may extend
into the terminal building. It is unlikely that a court would extend
the process of embarking to include the entire period after which
the passenger enters the terminal building, if the court considers
the treaty history and gives weight to the rejection of a proposal
to have embarkation begin at that time." Futhermore, the terms of
the Convention provide that a carrier cannot take advantage of
the liability limitations unless they are printed on the passenger's
ticket." The primary emphasis, however, is apparently placed upon
the control exercised by the airline over the passengers. A court
could conceivably hold that a carrier assumes control over the pas-
senger when the ticket is issued to him. At that point, arguably,
41 I am unable to agree, however, that this particular hazard is an in-
cidental risk of air travel when it occurs within the confines of an
airport terminal. Rather, in my view, a terrorist attack inside an
airport is no more likely than the bombing of a restaurant, bank or
other public place.
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1977)
(dissenting opinion).
'9 550 F.2d at 158.
50 Id.
51 Minutes at 82-83 (as cited in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
550 F.2d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 1977)).
"Article 3(l)(e), 3(2).
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the airline has given its approval to board the plane, and the first
step of embarkation has taken place."
Aspects of control will vary from case to case and will certainly
change in future years, so that it is impossible to forecast now what
a court will consider to be control in the future." It is now at least
established in one circuit that the danger of terrorism is a risk
inherent in air transportation. Terrorism is certainly not unique
to air transportation, so it is difficult to delineate the risks which
will be considered inherent in air travel. The opportunity remains
for future plaintiffs to argue coverage within Article 17 because
their injury resulted from exposure to another air transportation
risk while they were under the control of the airline, despite their
distance from the aircraft.'
L. Randall Yazbeck
"The Evangelinos court did note that control may be irrelevant in certain
instances. For example, the airline might exercise strict control over passengers
when they are checking their baggage, relinquish control, and then reassume it
after they enter the line to go through the gate leading to the aircraft. 550 F.2d
at 155 n.8a.
[T]he technology of embarkation has . . . changed in ways unfore-
seeable to the Warsaw delegates. Moreover, airports are today far
larger and boarding procedures substantially more complex than
forty-six years ago. And, many of the operations of embarking have
been moved inside the terminal building. Indeed, even the boarding
ladder, now being increasingly replaced by the jetway, may soon
become anachronism.
528 F.2d at 37-38 n.18.
One writer suggests that:
[C]onsideration could be given to the question whether the present
provision of Article 20 (providing a due care defense for the carri-
er) of the Convention should not continue to be applicable to dam-
age sustained during embarkation and disembarkation. The rule of
absolute liability would then apply only in respect of damage sus-
tained on board an aircraft in flight.
Heller, Notes on the Proposed Revision of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 142, 146 (1971).
See Note, Warsaw Convention-Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries
Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FoRD. L. REv. 369 (1976).
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